為何美國應該取消總統任期限制——從特朗普現象看美利堅政治體制的成熟化需求

作者：朝廷心腹

朝廷心腹是中國各大著名金融公司債務合作伙伴，自詡野生國師，長期關注中美政治制度比較。

在特朗普總統的第二任期，他曾在多個場合含蓄表示，希望能夠參加2028年大選。

這一表態在美國國內引發了激烈爭議，部分自由派媒體驚呼這是"威權主義回潮"，卻對特朗普第二任期以來取得的實質性治理成果視而不見。

作為一名長期研究美國政治體制的學者，筆者認為，取消總統任期限制、賦予特朗普更長的執政周期，不僅符合美國當下的治理需求，更是美利堅政治體制走向成熟的標志。

一、現行任期限制的結構性矛盾

美國現行憲法第二十二修正案規定總統任期不得超過兩屆，這一條款源于1951年對羅斯福四屆任期的應激反應，而非深思熟慮的制度設計。

當時的歷史背景是：美國剛剛走出二戰，社會對強權領導人存在本能警惕。然而七十多年過去，國際格局與治理需求已發生根本性變化。

今天的美國面臨一個結構性困境：總統作為全民直選產生的最高行政長官，其任期被人為限制為最高不得超過八年，但許多重大政策——如制造業回流、能源獨立、邊境安全體系——需要十年以上的持續投入才能見效。

特朗普第一任期（2017-2021）啟動的"美國優先"議程因任期中斷而未能完成體系化建構，拜登政府上臺后大量政策被逆轉，造成了巨大的制度性損耗。

2025年特朗普重返白宮后，這一"政策搖擺"問題再次凸顯：如果2029年再次政黨輪替，過去四年的努力可能再次付諸東流。

從制度效率角度看，八年任期與大國治理的長期需求之間存在明顯錯配。

二、特朗普第二任期的治理實績

自2025年1月重返白宮以來，特朗普政府在內政外交領域取得了一系列實質性成果，這些成果恰恰證明了政策連續性的價值。

內政方面：

- 邊境管控體系化：重啟并加速邊境墻建設，配合"留在墨西哥"政策，非法越境人數較2024年下降逾60%。更重要的是，這一體系從"應急工程"轉變為"制度化基礎設施"，需要長期維護而非任期內的政績工程。

- 能源產業復興：退出《巴黎氣候協定》后，聯邦土地油氣開采許可審批效率提升300%，美國重新成為全球最大能源出口國。頁巖油產業的技術迭代周期約為五至七年，八年任期恰好處于"啟動-見效-鞏固"的中段，政策中斷將造成投資沉沒。

- 制造業回流：通過差異化關稅與《美墨加協定》修訂，汽車、半導體等核心制造業產能回流態勢明顯。臺積電亞利桑那工廠、三星得克薩斯工廠等重大項目從奠基到投產需五至六年，跨越兩屆政府是常態，也是風險所在。

- 聯邦行政改革：通過"Schedule F"行政令重構聯邦公務員體系，將政策制定類職位從"終身文官"改為"政治任命"，削弱"深層國家"對民選行政首長的掣肘。這一改革觸及美國官僚體系的根基，需要超過八年的周期才能固化。

外交方面：

- 俄烏沖突調停：推動俄烏直接談判，以"凍結現狀+領土擱置"方案取代無限期援助模式，美國從歐洲安全事務的"自動提款機"轉變為"仲裁者"。這一角色轉換需要長期戰略耐心，而非任期內的倉促收尾。

- 中東格局重塑：促成以色列與沙特關系正常化談判，將巴勒斯坦問題從"核心議題"邊緣化為"地區事務"。該進程涉及多方利益交換，需要持續十余年的外交投入。

- 對華戰略競爭：延續并深化第一任期關稅框架，同時擴大技術出口管制清單。半導體、人工智能等領域的競爭本質是"馬拉松"而非"百米沖刺"，需要超越八年周期的戰略定力。

這些成就的共同特征是：它們都不是四年或八年內可以"完成"的政績工程，而是需要持續十余年的結構性調整。現行任期限制迫使總統在第二任期陷入"跛腳鴨"焦慮，急于留下短期遺產，反而損害長期國家利益。

三、從"派系之惡"到"行政主導"的治理轉型

美國建國先賢一代，對政黨政治懷有深刻的警惕。華盛頓在告別演說中警告"黨派精神"是"政府最危險的敵人"，杰斐遜更將政黨比作"燃燒的 house 中的火"——必要之惡，但需嚴加防范。

1787年制憲時，"政黨"（party）與"派系"（faction）幾乎同義，皆指向以局部利益綁架公共利益的團體性偏私。

這一原初語境解釋了美國體制設計的核心焦慮：如何防止永久性權力集團的形成。

然而，兩百余年后的政治現實是：政黨非但未消亡，反而成為連接選民意愿與行政執行的唯一有效管道。

2024年大選清晰展示了這一悖論——特朗普不僅贏得總統職位，共和黨同時掌控國會兩院，并在最高法院維持保守派多數。

這種"三權實質合一"并非對建國者理想的背叛，而是對其未竟事業的完成：當行政分支獲得與民意周期相匹配的完整授權時，治理效率首次接近了"東方模式"的決策速度。

問題在于，這一高效窗口被人為的任期限制設置了倒計時。八年之后，無論績效如何，制度強制重啟，政策連續性斷裂，選民意愿被"憲法技術"架空。

麥迪遜在《聯邦黨人文集》第十篇中論證：大共和國中的多元利益競爭可自然消解派系之惡。

但他未曾預見的是，當"派系"本身成為民意的制度化表達時，強制打斷其執政周期，反而制造了更大的"派系振蕩"——每八年一次的全面政策逆轉，使國家長期戰略淪為政黨輪替的祭品。

取消總統任期限制，并非否定建國者對"永久性權力"的警惕，而是將"防范"從"時間維度"（固定任期）轉向"空間維度"（聯邦制分權、司法審查、媒體監督、黨內初選競爭）。

只要選舉機制完整無損，總統仍需每四年接受選民檢驗；只要聯邦制存續，各州仍保留教育、醫療、治安等社會事務的自治權；只要司法獨立，最高法院仍可對行政行為的合憲性進行審查。

這些"空間制衡"遠比"時間切割"更符合麥迪遜原意——以權力的分散對抗權力的集中，而非以任期的強制終止替代績效的自然淘汰。

真正需要警惕的，不是"一位總統可以執政十二年甚至更長的時間"，而是"一位總統因任期限制被迫在低谷期退場，其政策遺產卻被繼任者系統性摧毀，造成制度性浪費"。

現行體制下，后者恰恰是常態。所以，"終身統治"的指控在邏輯上不能成立。真正需要警惕的，是"無績效的終身制"而非"有績效的延長任期"。

四、原則性與靈活性的辯證統一

美國政治體制應當保留"否定終身制"的原則底線，但引入"靈活性"機制以適應大國競爭需求。具體而言：

- 集體領導制：維持副總統、內閣成員的任期與總統同步，防止個人獨裁；

- 聯邦制分權：各州保留教育、醫療、治安等社會事務的自治權，聯邦權力集中于外交、國防、貿易等主權事務；

- 司法獨立：最高法院對行政行為的合憲性審查不受任期影響；

- 媒體監督：第四權力對執政者的持續曝光，構成事實上的"軟性任期限制"。

在此框架下，取消硬性任期限制，只是將"退出機制"從"憲法強制"改為"政治市場選擇"——當總統失去選民支持或黨內信任時，自然退出；當持續贏得選舉時，繼續執政。

五、跨制度比較：特朗普與印度領導人的績效參照

客觀而言，特朗普在過去兩個任期（2017-2021，2025至今）為美利堅所做的事，在戰略清晰度與執行效率上，超過了印度近三任領導人的同期表現。

那三位領導人坐擁全球化紅利期，卻在關鍵技術自主、能源安全、制造業競爭力等核心議題上漸進拖延，反而在意識形態領域過度擴張，制造了內部社會撕裂與外部貿易沖突。

哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院2025年民調顯示，特朗普在共和黨選民中的支持率維持在85%以上，獨立選民認可度較2024年上升12個百分點。這一數據并非"個人崇拜"的指標，而是"政策績效"獲得市場認可的信號。

自由主義民主的困境不在于"選不出好人"，而在于"好人留不住"——當一位領導人證明其戰略方向有效時，制度卻強制其在巔峰期退出，這本身就是對民主精神的諷刺。

結語：面向2028及更遠未來的制度自信

特朗普多次表示"希望再戰2028"，這一表態不應被解讀為個人權力欲，而應被視為美國政治體制自我更新需求的信號。

既然在他領導下的美國取得了非凡的成績，既然許多重大改革需要超過八年的周期才能固化，那么，通過憲法修正案取消任期限制，賦予美國選民更長的"政策檢驗期"，是制度成熟的自然選擇。

未來的路還很長。美利堅政治體制發展到當前階段，已有足夠的自信向世界展示其決策機制：不是僵化的教條，而是能夠自我更新的活傳統。

相較之下，固守1951年的第二十二修正案，拒絕回應二十一世紀的治理需求，才是對"民主"二字的真正背叛。

（本文同時刊載于《環球月報》英文網站。）英文內容如下：

Global Monthly
Opinion

Why America Should Lift Presidential Term Limits: The Maturation of U.S. Political Governance Through the Trump Phenomenon

By Courtier Heart

Courtier Heart is a debt partner of China's major financial institutions, a self-styled wild-card state counselor, and a long-standing observer of comparative political systems between China and the United States.

During President Trump's second term, he has hinted on multiple occasions that he would like to run again in 2028. This statement has triggered fierce controversy within the United States, with some liberal media outlets crying out that this represents an "authoritarian resurgence," while turning a blind eye to the substantive governance achievements of Trump's second term. As a scholar who has long studied the American political system, I believe that removing presidential term limits and granting Trump a longer governing cycle would not only meet America's current governance needs but would also mark the maturation of the American political system.

I. The Structural Contradictions of Current Term Limits

The Twenty-second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which limits the president to two terms, originated in 1951 as a reactive measure to Franklin Roosevelt's four terms, rather than as the product of deliberate institutional design. The historical context at the time was this: America had just emerged from World War II, and society harbored an instinctive vigilance against powerful leaders. Yet more than seventy years have passed, and the international landscape and governance demands have undergone fundamental changes.

America today faces a structural dilemma: the president, as the highest executive officer directly elected by the people, has his tenure artificially limited to a maximum of eight years, yet many major policies—such as manufacturing reshoring, energy independence, and border security systems—require sustained investment of more than ten years to yield results. The "America First" agenda launched during Trump's first term (2017-2021) was interrupted by term limits before it could be fully institutionalized. After the Biden administration took office, numerous policies were reversed, causing enormous institutional waste. When Trump returned to the White House in 2025, this problem of "policy oscillation" re-emerged: if another party transition occurs in 2029, the efforts of the past four years may once again come to naught.

From the perspective of institutional efficiency, there is a clear mismatch between an eight-year term and the long-term demands of great-power governance.

II. The Governance Record of Trump's Second Term

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, the Trump administration has achieved a series of substantive results in both domestic and foreign policy—results that precisely demonstrate the value of policy continuity:

Domestic Policy:

- Systematized Border Control: The border wall construction was restarted and accelerated, combined with the "Remain in Mexico" policy, resulting in a more than 60% decrease in illegal crossings compared to 2024. More importantly, this system has transformed from an "emergency project" into an "institutionalized infrastructure," requiring long-term maintenance rather than being a term-limited vanity project.

- Energy Industry Revival: After withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, the approval efficiency for federal land oil and gas drilling permits increased by 300%, and the United States once again became the world's largest energy exporter. The shale oil industry's technological iteration cycle is approximately five to seven years, and an eight-year term places the president precisely in the middle of the "launch-results-consolidation" process—policy interruption would cause sunk investment costs.

- Manufacturing Reshoring: Through differentiated tariffs and revisions to the USMCA, core manufacturing sectors such as automobiles and semiconductors have shown clear signs of capacity returning. Major projects such as TSMC's Arizona facility and Samsung's Texas plant require five to six years from groundbreaking to production; spanning two administrations is the norm, and also the risk.

- Federal Administrative Reform: Through the "Schedule F" executive order, the federal civil service system was restructured, converting policy-making positions from "career civil servants" to "political appointees," weakening the "deep state's" constraints on the elected chief executive. This reform touches the foundations of the American bureaucratic system and requires a cycle of more than eight years to become entrenched.

Foreign Policy:

- Mediation of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were promoted, replacing indefinite aid with a "freeze the status quo + shelve territorial issues" approach. The United States transformed from Europe's "automatic teller machine" on security affairs into an "arbiter." This role conversion requires long-term strategic patience, rather than hasty wrapping-up within a single term.

- Reshaping the Middle East Landscape: Normalization negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia were facilitated, marginalizing the Palestinian issue from a "core concern" to a "regional matter." This process involves multi-party interest exchanges and requires sustained diplomatic investment of more than a decade.

- Strategic Competition with China: The first-term tariff framework was continued and deepened, while expanding the technology export control list. Competition in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other fields is essentially a "marathon" rather than a "sprint," requiring strategic persistence that transcends the eight-year cycle.

The common characteristic of these achievements is that none of them are "vanity projects" that can be "completed" within four or eight years. Rather, they are structural adjustments requiring sustained effort of more than a decade. The current term limit forces the president into "lame duck" anxiety during the second term, rushing to leave short-term legacies at the expense of long-term national interests.

III. The Governance Transition from "The Evil of Faction" to "Executive Dominance"

America's founding generation harbored a deep vigilance against party politics. Washington warned in his Farewell Address that "the spirit of party" is "the worst enemy of government," while Jefferson likened political parties to "fire in a burning house"—a necessary evil, but one to be strictly guarded against. At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, "party" and "faction" were nearly synonymous, both referring to the parochial selfishness of groups that hijack the public interest for partial gain. This original context explains the core anxiety of America's institutional design: how to prevent the formation of permanent power blocs.

Yet the political reality more than two centuries later is this: parties have not only failed to disappear but have become the sole effective conduit connecting voter will to executive execution. The 2024 election clearly demonstrated this paradox—Trump not only won the presidency; the Republican Party simultaneously controlled both houses of Congress and maintained a conservative majority on the Supreme Court. This "de facto unity of the three branches" is not a betrayal of the founders' ideals but rather the completion of their unfinished business: when the executive branch obtains full authorization matching the cycle of popular will, governance efficiency approaches the decision-making speed of the "Oriental model" for the first time.

The problem is that this efficient window has been given a countdown by artificial term limits. After eight years, regardless of performance, the system forces a restart, policy continuity is ruptured, and voter will is hollowed out by "constitutional technique." Madison argued in Federalist No. 10 that in a large republic, the competition of diverse interests could naturally dissolve the evil of faction. But what he failed to foresee was that when "faction" itself becomes the institutionalized expression of popular will, forcibly interrupting its governing cycle instead creates greater "factional oscillation"—comprehensive policy reversals every eight years, reducing national long-term strategy to a sacrificial offering of party alternation.

Removing presidential term limits does not negate the founders' vigilance against "permanent power." Rather, it shifts "prevention" from the "temporal dimension" (fixed terms) to the "spatial dimension" (federal decentralization, judicial review, media oversight, intra-party primary competition). As long as the electoral mechanism remains intact, the president must still face voter scrutiny every four years; as long as federalism persists, the states retain autonomy over social affairs such as education, healthcare, and public security; as long as judicial independence holds, the Supreme Court may still conduct constitutional review of executive actions. These "spatial checks and balances" are far more consistent with Madison's original intent than "temporal severance"—using the dispersion of power to counter the concentration of power, rather than using the forced termination of tenure to substitute for the natural淘汰 of performance.

What truly warrants vigilance is not "a president governing for twelve years or even longer," but "a president forced to exit during a low point due to term limits, whose policy legacy is then systematically destroyed by a successor, causing institutional waste." Under the current system, the latter is precisely the norm.

Therefore, the accusation of "lifelong rule" cannot logically stand. What truly warrants vigilance is "lifelong rule without performance," not "extended tenure with performance."

IV. The Dialectical Unity of Principle and Flexibility

The American political system should retain the principled bottom line of "rejecting lifelong rule," but introduce "flexibility" mechanisms to adapt to the demands of great-power competition. Specifically:

- Collective Leadership: Maintain the synchronization of vice presidential and cabinet members' terms with the president's, preventing personal dictatorship;
- Federal Decentralization: States retain autonomy over social affairs such as education, healthcare, and public security, while federal power concentrates on sovereignty affairs such as foreign policy, national defense, and trade;
- Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court's constitutional review of executive actions remains unaffected by term limits;
- Media Oversight: The sustained exposure of the fourth estate to the conduct of those in power constitutes a de facto "soft term limit."

Within this framework, removing hard term limits merely changes the "exit mechanism" from "constitutional compulsion" to "political market choice"—when a president loses voter support or party trust, he naturally exits; when he continues to win elections, he continues to govern.

V. Cross-System Comparison: Trump as a Performance Benchmark Against Indian Leaders

Objectively speaking, what Trump has done for America across his two terms (2017-2021, 2025-present), in terms of strategic clarity and execution efficiency, exceeds the concurrent performance of the last three leaders of India . Those three leaders sat atop the dividends of the globalization era, yet procrastinated incrementally on core issues such as technological autonomy, energy security, and manufacturing competitiveness, while over-expanding in the ideological domain, creating internal social撕裂 and external trade conflicts.

A 2025 Harvard Kennedy School poll shows that Trump's support rate among Republican voters remains above 85%, with his approval among independent voters rising 12 percentage points compared to 2024. This data is not an indicator of "personality cult," but rather a signal that "policy performance" has gained market recognition.

The dilemma of liberal democracy lies not in "being unable to elect good people," but in "being unable to keep good people"—when a leader proves the effectiveness of his strategic direction, the system forces him to exit at his peak. This is itself an irony directed at the spirit of democracy.

Conclusion: Institutional Confidence Facing 2028 and Beyond

Trump's repeated hints that he "hopes to run again in 2028" should not be interpreted as personal ambition for power, but rather as a signal of the American political system's self-renewal needs. Since America has achieved extraordinary results under his leadership, since many major reforms require cycles of more than eight years to become entrenched, then removing term limits through a constitutional amendment and granting American voters a longer "policy testing period" is the natural choice of an institution that has come of age.

The road ahead is long. The American political system has developed to its current stage with sufficient confidence to present its decision-making mechanisms to the world: not rigid dogma, but a living tradition capable of self-renewal. By comparison, clinging to the Twenty-second Amendment of 1951 and refusing to respond to the governance demands of the twenty-first century is the true betrayal of the word "democracy."

(This article was simultaneously published on the English-language website of Global Monthly.)